Except convince anyone it was doing anything right at all. In his new book Too Big to Fail, Andrew Ross Sorkin portrays the firm’s fall as a tale of arrogance, blindness, stupidity, complacency, and greed – nearly every vice but gluttony and lust. But the numbers don’t bear that out: Lehman reacted decisively to the problems it was facing.
|
|
November |
February |
May |
August |
|
2007 |
2008 |
2008 |
2008 |
|
| Assets |
$691,063 |
$786,035 |
$639,432 |
$600,000 |
| Equity |
$22,294 |
$24,832 |
$26,276 |
$28,443 |
| Leverage |
30.7x |
31.7x |
24.3x |
21.1x |
| Liquidity pool |
$35,000 |
$34,000 |
$45,000 |
$42,000 |
| Repo financing1 |
37% |
35% |
33% |
NA |
| 1 as a percent of total funding | ||||
For financial institutions in trouble the prescription has always been: reduce assets, increase equity, improve liquidity. What did Lehman do? It cut total assets and raised shareholders’ equity, driving leverage down by 31%. It boosted its liquidity reserves to $42 billion, and trimmed short-term repurchase funding.
Lehman’s $2.9 billion loss for the third quarter of 2008 was hardly good news, but it came from what the Wall Street Journal called “savage cuts” to the value of its real estate. The Journal went on to say, “even longtime bears on the stock thought the firm was finally marking its residential portfolio to realistic levels.”
By the end of August 2008, Lehman had written down its troublesome real estate assets by 25% from the beginning of the year to $46 billion. With $28 billion in equity, it could afford to write them down by another 39% without destroying its capital base.
So why did Lehman’s damage control efforts fail? What sank the company? We’ll explore that in future posts, but it’s clearly not because Lehman ignored its problems, failed to act, or didn’t make real improvements to its finances.